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I. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Section 14 of article X is entitled "State retirement systems benefit
changes."' It provides:
A governmental unit responsible for any retirement or pension system
supported in whole or in part by public funds shall not after January 1,
1977, provide any increase in the benefits to the members or beneficiaries of such system unless such unit has made or concurrently makes
provision for the funding of the increase in benefits on a sound actuarial
basis.2

This peculiar constitutional provision first appeared on April 8, 1975,
when it was introduced as House Joint Resolution 291 in the Florida House
of Representatives by Jerry G. Melvin of Fort Walton Beach.3 On that day,

Richard A. Sicking practices law in Miami, Florida. He is general counsel for the
Florida Professional Firefighters and represented this organization as an intervenor in Florida
Ass'n of Counties, Inc. v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d 641 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992). Mr. Sicking received his
undergraduate education at the University of Michigan and the University of Miami. He
received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Miami in 1963.
1.FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
*

2. Id.
3. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 34, 177, 445 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
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the resolution was read for the first time and referred to the Committees on
Retirement, Personnel & Claims, and Appropriations, which later reported
it favorably.4
The House passed the bill, by a vote of 110 to 1, and sent it to the
Senate, which adopted the measure by a vote of 29 to 7.' The bill was
then submitted for approval by the voters at the general election scheduled
for November 1976.6 The proposed amendment was described on the ballot
as follows: "Proposing to add Section 14 to Article X of the State Constitution to provide that increases in the benefits payable under any governmental
supported retirement7 system after January 1, 1977, be fully funded by the
governmental unit."
In response to a question submitted by Representative Barry Richard,
the Assistant Attorney General, David K. Miller, rendered opinion 78-34.'
He concluded that the words "fully funded" appearing on the ballot proposal
cannot mean that a system is required to maintain reserves sufficient to
cover all potential claims to a mathematical certainty. Rather, it means that
"a system is required to maintain reserves sufficient to cover its probable
claims, as prudently determined with reference to risk based on statistical
and demographic computations." 9 Therefore, the phrase "fully funded" on
the ballot question "is not substantially different in meaning from the
constitutional . . . [provision requiring funding on a] sound actuarial
basis."
This constitutional provision applies to all Florida governmental units,
which includes local governmental units, as well as the state itself." This
section of the Florida Constitution does not require that benefits provided
by law, prior to January 1, 1977, be funded on a sound actuarial basis, only
that increases in benefits after that date be so funded.' 2 There is, however,
a requirement elsewhere in the law that benefits existing prior to January 1,
1977 be funded on a sound actuarial basis, 3 but this is required by statute,
not by the Florida Constitution.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 597; FLA. S. JOUR. 457-58 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
See Fla. HJR No. 291C (1975); FLA. S. JOUR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
Fla. HJR 291 (1975); FLA. S. JOUR. 457 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
1978 FLA. AW'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 78.
Id.
Id.
11. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
12. See id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 112.64(2), (3) (1991).
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II. STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
In 1978, Florida enacted part VII of chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes,
which is entitled "ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS.'
The statute has the short title "Florida Protection of Public
Employee Retirement Benefits Act."' 5 Section 112.61 of the Florida
Statutes, contains a statement of legislative intent which implements section
14 of article X of the state constitution. 6 The 1978 statute contained the
following statement of legislative intent:
It is the intent of the Legislature in implementing the provisions of s.
14 of Art. X of the State Constitution, relating to governmental
retirement systems, that such retirement systems or plans be managed,
administered, operated, and funded in such a manner as to maximize the
protection of public employee retirement benefits. 7
In 1983, this statement of legislative intent was changed by amendment
to add the following:
Inherent in this intent is the recognition that the pension liabilities
attributable to the benefits promised public employees be fairly, orderly,
and equitably funded by the current, as well as future, taxpayers.
Accordingly, except as herein provided, it is the intent of this act to
prohibit the use of any procedure, methodology, or assumptions the
effect of which is to transfer to future taxpayers any portion of the costs
which may reasonably have been expected to be paid by the current
taxpayers. This act hereby establishes minimum standards for the
operation and funding of public employee retirement systems and
plans."8
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),
among other things, requires adequate pension funding by private employers.' 9 ERISA was not imposed upon state or local governments. Thus, it
was left to the state and local governments to enact appropriate provisions

14. Ch. 78-170, §1, 1978 Fla. Laws 566 (codified at
(1979)).
15. FLA. STAT. §

FLA. STAT.

§ 112.60-112.67

112.60 (1991).

16. Id. § 112.61.
17. FLA. STAT.

§ 112.61 (1979).

18. Ch. 83-37, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 105 (amending FLA. STAT. § 112.61 (1983)).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 23

1468

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

of their own. ° Part VII of Florida Statutes chapter 112 applies to the state
and to local governments, which had been exempted from the requirements
of the federal statute. 2'
Part VII of Florida Statutes chapter 112 applies to any employee22
pension benefit plan supported in whole or in part by public funds.
Indeed, the statute specifically applies to the state for the Florida Retirement
System.23 This system includes those counties which are compulsory
members, and municipalities and special districts which are voluntary
members.24
Section 112.64(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that after October 1,
1980, a plan then in existence
shall be sufficient to meet the normal cost of the retirement system or
plan and to amortize the unfunded liability, if any, within 40 years..
. . For a retirement system or plan which .. .[came] into existence
after October 1,1980, the unfunded liability, if any, shall be amortized
within 40 years of the first plan year.25
The Florida statute requires a plan to amortize any unfunded liability
using acceptable actuarial cost methods, subject to the approval of the
Division of Retirement.26 Local governments are required to submit plans
for approval by the Division of Retirement in a statement of an enrolled
27

actuary.

Part VII of chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes sets forth what are
acceptable funding methods in an unusual fashion. The chapter incorporates
by reference not only those methods provided for in ERISA, but also those
permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Section 112.63(1) of the Florida Statutes, provides, "[t]he actuarial cost
methods utilized for establishing the amount of the annual actuarial normal
cost to support the promised benefits shall only be those methods approved

20. See id.§§ 1002(32), 1003.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.60-112.67 (1991); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003 (1988).
22. See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.60-112.67 (1991).
23. See id. §§ 112.62, 112.625(5).
24. See id.§§ 112.62, 121.051.
25. Id. § 112.64(2), (3). A longer period of time is allowed to those systems already
having a sound actuarial plan for amortization of unfunded liability. Id. § 112.64(2).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 112.63 (1991).
27. See id.§ 112.63(1)(f). An "[e]nrolled actuary means an actuary who is enrolled
under ... [ERISA] and who is a member of the Society of Actuaries or the American
Academy of Actuaries." Id.§ 112.625(3).
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in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and as permitted
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury."28
The methods approved in the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 are stated as follows: "Acceptable actuarial cost methods shall
include the accrued benefit cost method (unit credit method), the entry age
normal cost method, the individual level premium cost method, the
aggregate cost method, the attained age normal cost method, and the frozen
initial liability cost method."' 9 It further provides that, "[t]he Secretary of
the Treasury shall issue regulations to further define acceptable actuarial cost
methods."3 °
The Secretary of the Treasury has issued Treasury Regulation 1.412(c)(3)-1 entitled "Reasonable funding methods in implementation of section
3(31) of ERISA.'
It describes acceptable and unacceptable actuarial cost
methods.
In addition to requiring a plan of funding on a sound actuarial basis for
any unfunded liability that existed on October 1, 1980 for amortization over
40 years, 32 part VII of chapter 112 implements article X, section 14 of the
Florida Constitution with regard to increases in benefits by requiring a plan
of funding over 30 years.33

III. THE TURLINGTON CASE
The first case discussing the phrase "an increase in the benefits" is
Turlington v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement.34 In
Turlington, a taxpayer 5 challenged the validity of chapter 83-76, section
7, of the Laws of Florida. The law provided that an elected official covered
by the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), who was also employed in a
non-elected position covered by FRS, could retire from the non-elected
position while continuing employment in the elected office, but without

28. Id.§ 112.63(1).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(31) (1988).
30. Id.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(3)-l (1993).
32. FLA. STAT. § 112.64 (1991).
33. The statute provides: "The net increase, if any, in unfunded liability under the plan
arising from significant plan amendments adopted, changes in actuarial assumptions, changes
in funding methods, or actuarial gains or losses shall be amortized within 30 plan years."
Id. § 112.64(4).
34. 462 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
35. The plaintiff was also the Commissioner of Education.
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additional service credit.3 6 The taxpayer contended that this violated article
X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution because there was admittedly no
actuarial study done regarding the possible effect of chapter 83-76, section
7 on FRS.37
The First District Court of Appeal held that section 7 of chapter 83-76
was not an increase in benefits. Hence, article X, section 14 was not
involved. In dicta, the court said, "[t]he
absence of an actuarial study does
38
invalid.
statute
the
render
se,
not, per
This analysis was correct. Even if no actuarial study accompanied the
legislation in question, it does not necessarily violate article X, section 14.
It could still be demonstrated that no funding plan was required, or that the
funding plan employed was on a sound actuarial basis.
Turlington did not really deal with an increase in benefits, but rather,
it dealt with a change in the circumstances in which retirement can be taken.
The case illustrates that article X, section 14 presents a different kind of
question about a constitutional requirement. It is not a question of facial
invalidity, or whether the enactment contains constitutionally impermissible
language or provisions. Nor is it a question of being unconstitutional as
applied in the sense that the legislative language produces an unconstitutional result for a particular person or group of persons. Rather, the question
is whether the governmental body properly performed an act in connection
with legislation increasing pension benefits for public employees. It is a
new kind of constitutional question: Did the government fund the increase
on a sound actuarial basis or provide a plan of such funding? The question
for the courts is not what did the legislative body enact, but rather, what
provision for funding on a sound actuarial basis did the legislative body
make for that enactment. Having said this, the next question must be:
What is the remedy for the failure to fund on a sound actuarial basis?
The term "funding on a sound actuarial basis" is not one of ordinary
understanding.39 Indeed, part VII of chapter 112 requires that the funding
plan be accompanied by "[a] statement by the enrolled actuary that the
report is complete and accurate and that in his opinion the techniques and
assumptions used are reasonable and meet the requirements and intent of

36. Ch. 83-76, § 7, 1983 Fla. Laws 247, 251 (amending FLA. STAT. § 121.091(9)(b)7
(1983)). Chapter 83-76 was later repealed and modified by Florida Laws chapter 84-I I,

section 1. Turlington, 462 So. 2d at 66 n.I.
37. Turlington, 462 So. 2d at 66-67.

38. Id. at 67.
39. Florida Ass'n of Counties v.Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d
641, 643-44 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); affd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992).
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this act."4 This means that whether or not the legislative body performed
the act (funding on a sound actuarial basis), which is constitutionally
required in connection with legislation increasing pension benefits for public
employees, is a question of opinion to be answered by expert witnesses.
This is an unusual test of a constitutional requirement.

IV. THE FLORIDA ASS'N OF COUNTIES CASE
FloridaAss 'n of Counties v. Departmentof Administration,Division of
Retirement"' clearly illustrates this constitutional requirement. In 1970,
Florida consolidated its retirement benefits into FRS. 2 FRS contains a
"special risk" category of retirement, which is for police officers, firefighters, and correction officers.43 The statute provides that they have an earlier
retirement date than other employees." When chapter 112 of the Florida
Statutes was originally enacted in 1970, employees in the "special risk"
category had a two percent per year service credit, which was generally a
higher benefit than other employees received.4" The retirement benefit was
calculated by a percent per year of creditable service times average monthly
compensation. 46 The service credit was increased to three percent per year
for service after September 30, 1974. 47 Effective October 1, 1978, the
Legislature reduced the three percent service credit to two percent. 8
In Florida Sheriffs Ass'n v. Department of Administration,4 9 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the reduction was valid 5 The court
stated that a retired employee has a vested right in the amount of his
pension and a subsequent enactment could not change that. However, active
employees had no such vested right. 1 Therefore, the Legislature could
change benefits for active employees, even reduce them, for given years of

40. FLA. STAT. § 112.63(l)()

(1991) (emphasis added).

41. 580 So. 2d at 641.
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 121.011(2), 121.045 (1991).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
(1979)).
49.
50.
51.

Id. § 121.0515.
Id. § 121.021(29).
Id. § 121.091(1)(a).
Id. § 121.091(1).
FLA. STAT. § 121.091(1)(a)2 (1991).
Ch. 78,308, §6, 1978 Fla. Laws 875, 883 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 121.091 (1)(a)3
408 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1981).
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1036.
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service prior to retirement.52

In 1988, there was a proposal to restore the service credit from two
percent per year to three percent." It was considered by the Senate as the
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 150."4 The original bill would have
increased the service credit from two percent per year to three percent
immediately, and it would have required immediate funding for the increase
by the state, counties, and cities involved."
On June 6, 1988, the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 150 came
to the floor of the Senate.56 Senator Hollingsworth offered an amendment
which would increase the service credit from two percent per year to three
percent over a five year period, together with a five year phase-in of
contributions." Senator Girardeau raised a point of order that pursuant to
Senate Rule 3,13, the amendment was out of order, since the actuarial report
was for an increase from two percent per year to three percent in the same
year, not phased-in over five years. 8 The Chair requested Senator Baron
and Senator Langley to make a recommendation to the Senate on the point
of order. 9 Senator Baron reported:
The question is whether Senator Hollingsworth's amendment complies

with the requirement that changes to the state retirement system be
studied by an actuary. An actuarial study was presented to the Senate

in April of [1988] which studied the increase in special risk retirement
from 2 percent per year of service to 3 percent per year of service. The
increased employer contribution which was determined to be actuarially
required for that change was 7.4 percent. Senator Hollingsworth's
amendment divides both the increased benefit, and the increased
employer contribution into five portions. The amendment is a modification of the original proposal, the basis of the study, and therefore
protects the soundness of the Florida Retirement System, which is the
underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the point is not well taken.
The presiding officer ruled the point was not well taken.6"
The amendment, which was adopted June 7, 1988, provided for the

52. Id.
53. FLA. S.

JOUR.

1083, 1136 (Reg. Sess. 1988) (CS for SB 150).

54. Id. at 1136.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 1135-36.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1034 (amendment 1).
FLA. S. JOUR. 1035, 1083 (Reg. Sess. 1988) (point of order).
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1083 (ruling on the point of order by Senator Girardeau on Rule 3.13).
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"phasing-in" of the increased benefit, and the funding of it, over a five-year
period.6 Senator Hair, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Personnel, Retirement and Collective Bargaining, explained his vote in regard to
this amendment:
The amendment offered by Senator Hollingsworth would "phase in" this
increased benefit over a five-year period which would have the effect
of reducing the immediate fiscal impact upon Special Risk employers.
Nonetheless, the ultimate fiscal impact associated with increasing the
retirement benefit of Special Risk members is still present, albeit spread
over a longer period of time. I am further concerned about the
precedent of "phasing in" new benefits; this is a concept never tried in
the FRS before and one that is specifically not recommended by the
FRSs' actuaries ... 62

The bill passed in the Senate, and the House concurred. 63 The measure
became law as chapter 88-238 of the Laws of Florida.64
Following enactment, the Florida Association of Counties and the
Florida League of Cities, along with two taxpayers, brought suit in Leon
County against the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement.
They sought a declaration. that chapter 88-238 was:
an improper exercise of the state's taxing and spending authority
because it funded the costs of increased benefits to special risk
members, composed of fire fighters and law enforcement officers, by
assertedly shifting the burdens [of payment] from current to future
taxpayers in violation of article X, section 14 of the state constitution. 61

The Florida Police Benevolent Association and the Florida Professional
Firefighters intervened as defendants,66 and after the circuit court held that
the statute did not violate the Florida Constitution, the plaintiffs appealed.67
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the circuit

61. Id. at 1136.
62. Id.
63. FLA. S. JOUR. 1136, 1272 (Reg. Sess. 1988).
64. Ch. 88-238, § 1, 1988 Fla. Laws 1327 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 121.071 (1989)).
65. Florida Ass'n of Counties v. Department of Admin., Div. of Retirement, 580 So. 2d
641, 643 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 595 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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court.68 On further review, the Supreme Court of Florida approved of and
adopted the decision of the First District Court of Appeal.6 9
The First District Court of Appeal described the phase-in of contributions and benefits as follows:
Period
1989
1990
1991
1992

% Increase in
Contributions
1.6
3.2
4.8
6.4

1993-

8.0

% Increase
in Benefits
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.070

The First District Court of Appeal stated that it found no case which
had definitively considered the meaning of the phrase "sound actuarial
basis.",7' It further noted that after hearing a diversity of expert opinions
at the trial that indicated the phrase "sound actuarial basis" is not precisely
defined in actuarial science, the trial court had accepted a consensus
definition that "a retirement program must be funded in such a way that the
retirement fund is able to meet its continuing obligations as and when they
mature., 72 The trial court held that chapter 88-238 met that test, 73 and
the Supreme Court of Florida later approved of the definition adopted by the
trial judge. 74

68. Id. at 646.
69. FloridaAss 'n of Counties, 595 So. 2d at 44.
70. FloridaAss 'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 643 (footnotes omitted). The dates for the
phase-in after 1989, as described in chapter 88-238 of the Laws of Florida, were impossible.
This was corrected in a subsequent revisor's ("glitch") bill, chapter 89-220 of the Laws of
Florida, which now appears in Florida Statute, sections 121.071 and 121.091. The First
District Court of Appeal did not consider this error significant: "Appellants also assert that
technical flaws in the original legislative bills ... all render the plan unsound, and therefore
constitutionally deficient. Assuming the validity of appellants' criticisms, the record does not
convincingly support the conclusion that asserted defects, if corrected, are constitutionally
mandated." Id. at 645.
71. Id. at 644.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FloridaAss 'n of Counties, 595 So.2d at 43-44. Approving Judge Hall's definition,
the court opined:
First, we have never addressed the meaning of the phrase "sound actuarial
basis," as contained in article X, section 14. We agree with the trial court and
district court of appeal that "sound actuarial basis" means that "a retirement
program must be funded in such a way that the retirement fund is able to meet
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The district court observed that the phase-in scheme selected by the
Legislature clearly departed from plans used to fund benefit increases in the
past. Customarily, increases in benefits have been paid for by amortizing
the associated costs at a single rate over a thirty year period. The appellants
conceded that article X, section 14 did not dictate such a plan. 5
The appellants argued that the Legislature determined the controlling
meaning of article X, section 14 by its statement of legislative intent
contained in chapter 83-37 of the Laws of Florida, the 1983 amendment to
section 112.61 of the Florida Statutes. 6 The First District Court of Appeal
described that amendment in the following manner:
The legislature there declared that liabilities required to fund public
retirement system benefits must be funded equitably by current and
future taxpayers alike, and expressly prohibited the "transfer to future
taxpayers [of] any portion of the costs which may reasonably have been
expected to be paid by the current taxpayers. 77
In addition, the appellants argued that the legislative interpretation of
article X, section 14 contained in chapter 83-37 is entitled to a presumption
of correctness. The district court of appeal concluded that, under the
circumstances, chapter 83-37 is not entitled to such presumptive weight."
Those "circumstances," the court explained, are that article X, section 14
was adopted in 1976. The 1978 statement of legislative intent contained in
chapter 78-170 "merely required that governmental retirement systems or
plans be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such a manner as
to maximize the protection of public employee retirement benefits."7 9 The
court pointed out that "[n]ot until 1983 did the legislature express its intent
in implementing the provisions of Article X, section 14 to require that a
plan be equitably funded by the current, as well as future, taxpayers."8
The court reasoned that chapter 78-170 of the Laws of Florida is more
contemporaneous with the constitutional provision than chapter 83-37.
Therefore, chapter 83-37 is not entitled to any presumptive weight that it is

its continuing obligations as and when they mature."
Id. (quoting Florida Ass 'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644).
75. Florida Ass'n of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644 n.7.
76. Id. at 644.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at n.9.
80. Florida Ass' of Counties, 580 So. 2d at 644 n.9.
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a contemporaneous legislative interpretation of article X, section 14.81
The appellants also advanced a statutory argument that chapter 88-238
conflicted with the statement of intent contained in chapter 83-37. The First
District Court of Appeal decided that a "sounder position is to harmonize
the legislature's intent for the amendment with its intent for the original
law.",12 Thus, rather than prohibiting the taxing of future taxpayers,
chapter 83-37 requires that costs associated with chapter 88-238 are passed
on to future taxpayers in a reasonable manner.8 3 The court noted that a
consulting actuary had testified that the amendment assessed the cost to the
appropriate generation of taxpayers; "those who are being served by the
generation4 of special risk members who are receiving the particular
8
benefit.

This is an example of harmonizing one provision of the Florida Statutes
with another. The court's obligation to do that does not apply to any
conflict between the Florida Statutes and an ordinance of municipal
government.8 5 Whether local government could, by ordinance, have
accomplished the same phase-in of benefits and contributions poses a
different question. It should be noted that article X, section 14 is now to be
read in conjunction with article VII, section 18 of the Florida Constitution,
adopted in 1990, which imposes limitations upon the Legislature to pass
laws requiring counties or municipalities to spend funds or limit their ability
to raise revenue. Article VII, section 18(d) specifically provides, "[I]aws
adopted to require funding of pension benefits existing on the effective date
of this section ...

are exempt from the requirements of this section.'86

FloridaAss 'nof Counties was significant because it involved not only
the state and all the counties in Florida, but the cities that were voluntary
members of the State Retirement System as well. It also involved all law
enforcement officers, firefighters, and correction officers employed by the
state, the counties, and the city members of FRS. Quite plainly, it involved
a large number of people, many governmental units, and large sums of
money.

81.

Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.at 645.
Id.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)(a) (1987); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075

(Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed, 471 U.S. 1096 (1985).
86. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(d).
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V. THE BRANCA CASE
In contrast, Branca v. City of Miramar17 involved one man and a
small city. Frank Branca was the mayor of the City of Miramar for nearly
sixteen consecutive years.8" Section 112.048 of the Florida Statutes, which
predates article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution, requires that cities
provide a retirement benefit of half-pay to elective officers who retire
voluntarily after holding office in that city twenty consecutive years.89 No
retirement benefits are required for officials who serve less than twenty
consecutive years.90
In 1988, the City of Miramar passed Ordinance 88-16 which created a
pension plan. 91 Under the ordinance, "[a]n elected official retiring after
twenty years would receive annually [fifty] percent of his or her average
annual salary for the preceding five years. 9 2 The ordinance also provided
for reduced benefits in the event of earlier retirement,93 and for the elected
official to contribute five percent of his or her salary. The employee's
pension benefits were to be paid first from employee contributions, and once
those were exhausted, the balance was to be paid from the city's general
funds. 94
In 1989, Mayor Branca took an early retirement under this ordinance
at the reduced benefit. 9
His own contributions were exhausted two
96
months after he retired, and thereafter, the pension benefits were paid to
him by the city.97
On May 15, 1989, a new City Commission repealed the ordinance, but
payments Were continued to Mayor Branca from a budget item entitled
"disputed benefits payable."98 The City Clerk submitted the ordinance to
the Florida Department of Administration, Division of Retirement for
review. The Division's counsel gave an opinion that the ordinance violated
article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution and part VII of chapter 112

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

602 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 1376 n.5.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
See id. at 1375.
Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375 n.L
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
Id.
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of the Florida Statutes.99 Upon receipt of the Division's legal opinion, the
city filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 88-16 was
unconstitutional.' 0 Payments, however, were continued to Mayor Branca
until the ordinance was declared invalid.' 0'
The circuit judge, ruling in the city's favor, held that the pension
benefit was unlawful and should not be paid. 0 2 The circuit court found
that City of Miramar Ordinance 88-16 "was an increase in benefits as
contemplated in article X, section 14, because no such pension benefits
existed for elected officials prior to the enactment of Ordinance 88-16 apart
from those mandated in section 112.048" of the Florida Statutes.0 3 The
circuit judge found that the ordinance violated article X, section 14 of the
Florida Constitution.0 4 The trial judge also found that the city was not
estopped to deny the payment of pension benefits. Mayor Branca subsequently appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in a 2 to 1 decision written by
Judge Polen, concluded that the trial court was correct in denying the
continuation of the pension benefit on an estoppel basis. The majority held
that the ordinance in question was not a deferred compensation plan exempt
from funding requirements. The majority then turned to the constitutional
question posed by article X, section 14. The majority stated:
The trial court found, and certainly an argument can be made, that the
creation and establishment of a retirement plan for Miramar elected
officials under Ordinance 88-16 was an increase in benefits as contemplated in Article X, Section 14, because no such pension benefits existed
for elected officials prior to the enactment of Ordinance 88-16 apart
from those mandated in section 112.048, Florida Statutes. As such,
Ordinance 88-16 would be subject to the requirements of Article X,
Section 14. ...
Notwithstanding, we need not resolve the issue of whether the Ordinance's enactment constituted an "increase" in benefits under Article X,
Section 14, Florida Constitution. Rather, we certify the following
question:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1376.
Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
Id.at 1376.
Id.at 1375.
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WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 14, AND THE REQUIREMENTS
THEREOF APPLY ONLY TO EXISTING COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL
PENSION PLANS, OR WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS ALSO
APPLY TO COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL PENSION PLANS THAT
INCREASE OTHER EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL [i.e., STATE]
05
PENSION PLAN BENEFITS.1
Judge Farmer dissented, pointing out that when the benefit is not
funded on a sound actuarial basis, the remedy is not to obliterate the benefit,
but rather to require the funding of it by the governmental unit. Judge
Farmer wrote:
The essential rationale for the constitutional and statutory provisions
cited by the city, from which I deduce public policy, is not that, if a
particular plan is unsound, no one should get paid their retirement.
Rather, the policy is to ensure that all retirees actually get paid by
making the plans financially trustworthy and capable of meeting
reasonably foreseeable obligations. To deny benefits to a retiree where
the plan is unsound but the city is able to pay is to shoot the patient
rather than to find the cure. 6
The majority decision, holding that the case did not present either a
factual or legal basis for estoppel, disagreed with Judge Farmer's dissent
that there was a contractual obligation on the part of the city to pay the
promised benefit and that the city was estopped from denying the benefit.
The real question, however, is suggested in Judge Farmer's dissent.
Essentially, the majority decision does not resolve the question of what is
the proper remedy. Specifically, what remedy is appropriate when a
beneficiary claims entitlement to a pension benefit that was otherwise
lawfully enacted, but was not funded on a sound actuarial basis within the
meaning of article X, section 14? Should the court order the governmental
unit to fund the benefit on a sound actuarial basis, as required by article X,
section 14, or should the court declare the benefit non-existent for the failure
to comply with article X, section 14?
The trial court's decision on this point could work mischief. There are
a number of possibilities. The government could create a new benefit or
increase an existing benefit. The government could provide no funding or
some funding, but not on an actuarially sound basis. The government could
also initially provide funding on a sound actuarial basis, but discontinue

105. Id. at 1376-77.
106. Id. at 1379 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
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such funding at a later time. Finally, the government could even provide
funding and experts could disagree as to whether such funding was on a
sound actuarial basis.
A member or beneficiary of a pension system may bring a civil action
to recover benefits due to him, to enforce his rights, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits."0 7 Under the trial judge's decision in Branca, if a
member or beneficiary brought suit to complain that an increase in benefits
was not adequately funded, the benefit would be abolished." 8 Similarly,
if the governmental unit could bring suit that the increased benefit was not
adequately funded, the benefit would be abolished. Under any scenario, an
attempt to compel the government to fund an increase on a sound actuarial
basis would result in the benefit being abolished. How then can the
government be compelled to fund an increased benefit on a sound actuarial
basis?
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of the case on the
certified question, 0 9 and on January 13, 1994, the court handed down its
decision." 0 The supreme court restated the certified question as follows:
WHETHER ARTICLE X, SECTION 14 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION APPLIES ONLY TO INCREASES IN EXISTING COUNTY
OR MUNICIPAL PENSION PLAN BENEFITS."'
On the procedural question, the court concluded that under the
circumstances, the city could seek a declaratory judgment to challenge the
constitutional validity of its own pension ordinance." 2 As to the restated
certified question, the court rejected Branca's claim that a new benefit is not
governed by article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution, holding:
We reject Branca's contention that there can be no increase in benefits
unless there is an existing plan. When there is no plan, there are no
benefits. However, if a plan is adopted the benefits are increased. It
is unreasonable to believe that article X, section 14, requires that an
increase in benefits from a preexisting plan be actuarially sound but that
a new pension plan carries no similar requirement. We hold that article

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

FLA. STAT. §

112.66(5) (1978).

Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1375.
Branca v. City of Miramar, 618 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1993).
Branca v. City of Miramar, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S28 (Fla. Jan. 13, 1994).
Id. at S28.

112. Id.
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X, section 14, applies to new plans as well as existing plans." 3
Thus, although Florida Statutes part VII, chapter 112 already required that
a new plan be funded on a sound actuarial basis, the Branca decision raises
that requirement from a statutory one to a constitutional one under article
X, section 14.
Branca did better on his estoppel argument, however. The court
concluded that the pension ordinance was properly enacted.I, 4 Although
recognizing that estoppel against the government has limited applications,
the supreme court held:
Branca relied upon the fact that ordinance 88-16 had been duly enacted
by the city commission. He irrevocably changed his position in reliance
upon the ordinance when he retired. The city should not be permitted
to unilaterally terminate his pension benefits ....
However, the City of Miramar had the statutory authority under
section 112.048(3), Florida Statutes (1987), to provide a pension plan
for elected officials. The fact that the city created a program which was
found to be improperly funded does not preclude relief under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel." 5
The certified question as presented by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal and as rephrased by the Florida Supreme Court, is not exactly
correct. The question posed was whether article X, section 14 of the Florida
Constitution applies only to increases in existing county or municipal
pension plans. The holding, however, applies article X, section 14 both to
increases in existing plans and new benefits in newly createdplans. The
certified question, however, refers to existing county or municipal plans and
does not mention the existing state plan. Since the case involved the City

113. Id.
114. Id. at S29.
115. Branca, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at S29. The court then quoted, with approval, Judge
Farmer's dissenting opinion:
The city looks for its authority to cancel this plan in certain state constitutional
and statutory provisions relating to the actuarial soundness of public employer
retirement plans in Florida. But I do not understand how the fact that this plan
may violate these provisions yields the conclusion that the city can just stop
paying one of its retirees. I should have thought that the remedy for the
constitutional/statutory violation would be to order the city to make the plan
actuarially sound out of its own pockets (whether from tax increases or other
revenues) but not to order it to stop paying retirement income.
Id. (quoting Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1378 (Farmer, J., dissenting)).

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 23

1482

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

of Miramar, the reference to municipal pension plans is appropriate. The
reference to county pensions plans is dicta." 6 Although, the more
interesting question is whether the omission of any reference to "state
pension plan benefits" was inadvertent or intentional.
In a case involving the State Retirement System, the court would have
another constitutional provision to consider in ordering the Legislature to
fund the promised benefit; specifically, the separation of powers requirement." 7' In such a case, the court would have to balance a separation of
powers consideration with the specific mandate of article X, section 14 that
increases in pension benefits in an existing plan, or new benefits in a newly
created plan per the Branca decision, be funded on a sound actuarial basis.
Wages and pensions are not the same. There are differences among
wages, leave benefits, and pensions, particularly as to funding over a short
versus a long period of time." 8
State v. Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n..9 and Chiles v. United
Faculty of Florida20 involve the funding of wages and leave benefits that
were provided for in collective bargaining agreements. These cases give an
indication of how the supreme court might address the problem of requiring
the Legislature to fund a promised pension benefit in accordance with article
X, section 14.
In PBA, the Governor had entered into collective bargaining agreements
with several unions which were to be effective between 1987 and 1990.121
The agreements incorporated by reference certain provisions of the Florida
Administrative Code governing annual leave (vacation) and sick leave for
public employees. In 1988, the Legislature enacted its General Appropriations Act, which altered the annual leave and sick leave, and which in the
aggregate may have had the effect of reducing the bargained-for benefits.
The unions contended that the Legislature's actions abridged the right to
bargain collectively, as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution. Therefore, the revisions to the collective bargaining agreements contained in the appropriations act were invalid. The trial court

116. It is also inappropriate dicta, since counties do not have pension plans. They are
compulsory members of the FRS, the state plan. FLA. STAT. § 121.021(10) (1991); FLA.
STAT. § 121.051(1) (1991).
117. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2.

118. Pensions and wages of public employees are subject to collective bargaining. City
of Tallahassee v. Public Employees Relations Comm., 410 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1981).

119. 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992) [hereinafter PBA].
120. 615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).
121. PBA, 613 So. 2d at 416.
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granted summary judgment in favor of the unions, and the district court of
appeal affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court discussed the differences
between collective bargaining in the private sector and the public sector.
The court also discussed separation of powers with respect to the Executive
branch's ability to enter into collective bargaining agreements calling for
additional appropriations versus the Legislature's exclusive right to
appropriate funds. The court did admit, however, that "[t]he facts of the
present case are somewhat unique, in that the legislature did not simply
under fund or refuse to fund certain benefits, but rather unilaterally changed
them. Accordingly, we must determine whether the proviso language at
issue here falls under the exclusive domain of the legislature's appropriations power."' 2 The court adopted the following test:
We find this test to be a reasonable accommodation of both the right to
collectively bargain and the legislature's exclusive control over the
public purse. Where the legislature provides enough money to
implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change
the benefit, the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit
will be enforced. This result would not impede upon the legislature's
exclusive power over public funds, because the funds would already be
there to enforce the benefit. Where the legislature does not appropriate
enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the
conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if
contradictory to the negotiated agreement. Any other result would
necessarily entail impeding on the right to appropriate, since enforcing
the negotiated agreement would necessitate additional funding under this
scenario.'23
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the declaration that the appropriations act was unconstitutional and remanded the cause for further proceedings. The trial court was directed to determine whether the legislative
appropriation was sufficient to fund the bargained-for benefit: "If it was,
these provisions to the collective bargaining agreement must be enforced.
If these provisions were underfunded, the legislative determination shall
control."' 2 4
Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida'25 involved wages, specifically
pay raises, which the Legislature had authorized. Later, however, the

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 421 (footnotes and citation omitted).
Id.
615 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1993).

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

19

Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 23
1484

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

Legislature convened in special session and among other measures,
postponed the pay raises involved. During the 1992 regular session, it
eliminated them altogether. The unions involved filed suit, and the trial
court ruled in their favor, on the grounds that the Legislature's actions
violated article I, section 6 and section 10.126 The State appealed, and the
district court of appeal, without deciding the matter, certified the case to the
Florida Supreme Court for immediate review as a "throw up."' 27 The
court stated that the case was different from PBA 2 1 in which no final
agreement had been reached by the parties. In United Faculty, an
agreement had been reached, funded, unilaterally modified by the Legislature, and finally, unilaterally abrogated by the Legislature.
The supreme court described the problem in a nutshell. "Separation of
powers does not allow the unilateral and unjustified legislative abrogation
of a valid contract."'2 9 The trial court decision was affirmed. However,
on clarification, the decision was limited to the year in which the contracts
were funded. 3 '
Both of these cases deal with the Legislature's appropriation powers,
viewed by its co-equal partner, the Judicial branch, within the framework of
the constitutional protection of contracts of a general kind and collective
bargaining agreements specifically. These cases do involve the question of
the ability of the Florida Supreme Court to order the Legislature to
appropriate money to pay for the performance of a contract.

VI. CONCLUSION
As already suggested by the comment on FloridaAss 'n of Counties v.
Department of Administration, Division of Retirement,'3 ' the courts may
treat the Legislature's funding of increases in public employee pensions
differently from that of funding by municipalities.' 32 The courts' ability
to order the Legislature to fund a contract may be more limited than the
courts' ability to order a city to fund a promised benefit. When the case
involves a city, separation of powers considerations simply do not exist. If

126. Id.
127. Id. at 672; FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i).

128. 613 So. 2d at 415.
129. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d at 673.

130. Id at 677-78.
131. 580 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).

132. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/23

20

Sicking: Shoot the Patient or Find the Cure: The Florida Constitutional Re

1994]

Sicking

1485

the court was willing in United Faculty to require the Legislature to fund a
promised benefit because it had already been funded and then unfunded, and
was willing in PBA to remand the cause to determine whether there was
sufficient funding so as to require enforcement of the contract, then it should
not be the least reluctant to formulate a remedy by which the judicial branch
is capable of directing the Legislative branch to fund a promised benefit.
Thus, Judge Farmer's question recurs: Should we shoot the patient or find
the cure? What is the remedy for the failure of the legislative body
(whether state or local government) to fund on a sound actuarial basis, a
promised pension benefit to an employee who has already retired?' 33
Under FloridaSheriffs Ass 'n v. DepartmentofAdministration, Division
of Retirement,'34 such a retiree has a vested property right. This property
right cannot be taken away from him because of the failure of the government to provide for funding. The promised benefit must be funded by the
government in compliance with article X, section 14 of the Florida
In Branca, however, the supreme court was not confrontConstitution.'
ed with any consideration of separation of powers that might exist when the
government involved is the State of Florida itself. Thus, a case against the
state rather than a city would involve the balancing of several constitutional
considerations: the employee's contract and property rights; the specific
requirement that the government appropriate money as expressed in article
X, section 13; and the ability of the judicial branch to appropriate money.

133. Branca, 602 So. 2d at 1377-79.
134. 408 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 1981).
135. Branca, 19 Fla. L. Weekly at S28.
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